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Notes and Comments
Jones v. Barnes and the Right to Counsel on
Appeal: Is Effective Assistance of Counsel
More than Faerie Gossamer?
I. Introduction
In the movement to make legal services available to indi-
gents, courts strive to assure the presence of professional coun-
sel, with little apparent concern for the quality of service the
counsel provides.' Recently, however, there has been an increas-
ingly urgent call to make the effectiveness of counsel, not the
availability of counsel, the important issue.2
1. Carrington, The Right to Zealous Counsel, 1979 Duiw L. 1291, 1291.
2. For a discussion of the right to effective assistance of counsel, see Bazelon, The
Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CN. L. Ray. 1 (1973) (argues that society must
have a humane criminal justice system which treats defendants with understanding and
insight; proposes that a radical reconsideration of counsel's role is required); Craig, The
Right to Adequate Representation in the Criminal Process: Some Observations, 22 Sw.
L.J. 260 (1968) (argues that in order for the adversary system to function, there must be
effective assistance of counsel); Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a
Ground for Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. Rev. 289 (1964) (ex-
amines the state of criminal defense representation; discusses the problems in a claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and suggests improvements in the system of repre-
sentation); Comment, Ineffective Representation as a Basis for Relief from Conviction:
Principles for Appellate Review, 13 COLum. J.L. & Soc. PaoBs. 1 (1977) (comprehensive
examination of ineffective assistance of counsel claims); Note, Effective Assistance of
Counsel for the Indigent Defendant, 78 HAav. L. Rav. 1434 (1965) (examines specific
circumstances where a defendant may charge his counsel was ineffective; considers some
difficulties with the claim; suggests standards to protect defense attorneys from unwar-
ranted attacks and courts from frivolous claims).
The United States Constitution provides only that "[in all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. The term "effective assistance of counsel" comes from Justice
Sutherland's opinion in Powell v. Alabama:
All that it is necessary now to decide, as we do decide, is that in a capital case,
where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of
making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the
like, it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him
1
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In 1981, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit examined the issue of effective assistance of counsel as-
signed by the state to prosecute an appeal.3 A majority of the
court proclaimed a rule designed to ensure an appellate attor-
ney's effectiveness: when an appellant asks his assigned counsel
to raise nonfrivolous' points on appeal, the attorney "must argue
the additional points to the full extent of his professional
ability." 5
Last Term, the United States Supreme Court specifically
declined to adopt this standard. In Jones v. Barnes,6 the Su-
preme Court enounced the converse constitutional precept re-
garding performance of appellate counsel: assigned appellate
counsel has no constitutional obligation to raise every nonfrivo-
lous argument the defendant has requested him to present on
appeal.7
Part II of the Casenote explores the legal background of the
right to assistance of counsel. The following part sets out the
factual background of Barnes. The fourth part summarizes the
Supreme Court's opinion. Finally, Part V analyzes the impact of
the Barnes rule on the right to counsel. The Casenote concludes
that the Barnes rule does not trumpet the call in the legal com-
munity for effective assistance of counsel. Indeed, the holding
cannot expedite that call, because it does not advance a fresh
conception of effective assistance of counsel. Barnes does not ad-
as a necessary requisite of due process of law; and that duty is not discharged by
an assignment at such a time or under such circumstances as to preclude the giv-
ing of effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
3. Barnes v. Jones, 665 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983).
4. Throughout the Casenote, the term "nonfrivolous" is used synonomously with the
term "colorable."
5. Barnes v. Jones, 665 F.2d at 433. A rule requiring the appellate attorney to raise
the additional claims is significant because the Supreme Court has recognized that state
courts are not expected or assumed to address issues not raised by counsel. See, e.g.,
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128-29 (1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977).
On the appeal, both Barnes and his attorney submitted briefs to the appellate divi-
sion. The Second Circuit, however, asserted that Barnes' pro se briefs were no substitute
for the advocacy of experienced counsel. Therefore, the court found that appellate coun-
sel's failure to raise all the colorable claims urged by Barnes rendered the assistance
ineffective. Barnes v. Jones, 665 F.2d at 434.
6. 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983).
7. Id. at 3314.
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dress the distinction between the problems of ensuring effective
assistance of trial counsel and those of effective assistance of ap-
pellate counsel.
II. Legal Background
A. An Indigent's Right to Assistance of Counsel
1. At trial
In England, before the American Revolution, one accused of
a felony had no right to employ counsel in his defense.' After
the American Revolution, the sixth amendment of the United
States Constitution guaranteed that counsel could be employed.'
Yet, nowhere in the debates of the Congress which proposed
what became the sixth amendment is there any indication that
the amendment would require government to supply counsel for
indigents.10 The rule requiring appointment of counsel for de-
8. See W. BEANv, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMEICAN COURTS 9 (1955). The only
exception to this rule was the case of treason. Id.
Illogically, in crimes less serious than felonies, English law recognized the accused's
right to retain counsel and to make a defense with counsel's assistance. Id. at 8. For
instance, there was a group of misdemeanors, triable before the Star Chamber, where the
presence of counsel was mandatory. In the Star Chamber, a defendant was required to
have his answer to the charge signed by counsel. Failure to obtain counsel's signature
was deemed a confession that the charge was true. In these minor cases, the common law
provided punishment that was regarded as insignificant. The rationale behind this dis-
parity was explained in terms of the state's interest: the state's interest in misdemeanors
was so slight that the state could afford to be considerate toward these offenders. See id.
at 8-9. See also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975) (Justice Stewart's discus-
sion of the right to counsel in English criminal procedure).
9. By the time the sixth amendment was ratified in 1791, Congress had enacted two
laws which indicated that anyone who could afford counsel was guaranteed that right.
The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. XX, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92, provided that, in federal courts,
parties could plead and manage their own causes. This could be done personally or with
the assistance of counsel as provided by the rules of the court.
The Act of April 30, 1790, ch. IX, § 29, 1 Stat. 112, 118, provided
[t]hat any person who shall be accused and indicted of treason ... and in other
capital offences... shall... be allowed and admitted to make his full defence
by counsel learned in the law; and the court before whom such person shall be
tried, or some judge thereof, shall, and they are hereby authorized and required
immediately upon his request to assign to such person such counsel, not exceeding
two, as such person shall desire.
10. W. BFwNzv, supra note 8, at 23 ("The available debates on the various proposals
throw no light on the significance or the interpretation which Congress attributed to the
right to counsel."). Beaney offers an explanation for the paucity of meaning. "The lack of
comment could be attributed to the general feeling in this formative period that the
3
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fendants who could not afford one was not recognized until the
1930s.
In 1932, in Powell v. Alabama," the Supreme Court held:
[I]n a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ coun-
sel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense be-
cause of ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is
the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel
for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law . . .
Justice Sutherland, writing for the Court, referred to the right to
the aid of counsel as "fundamental in character,"" and a neces-
sity.' 4 The right to have counsel appointed was thus considered
a "logical corollary from the constitutional right to be heard by
counsel."'5
In 1938, in Johnson v. Zerbst,' the Supreme Court relying
on Justice Sutherland's invocation of the necessity of counsel,
announced an absolute rule requiring assistance of counsel for
all indigents on trial in federal courts. 7 Justice Black wrote:
"The Sixth Amendment withholds from federal courts, in all
criminal proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an ac-
cused of his life or liberty unless he has or waives the assistance
of counsel."' 8
Four years later, in Betts v. Brady, 9 the Supreme Court re-
fused to impose the Zerbst rule upon the states. In its view, the
fourteenth amendment required fairness in state trials, but the
Court was not convinced that the absence of counsel meant a
trial was unfair per se.20 Thus, under Betts, a state convict could
important processes of criminal law in the future would be those of the states." Id. at 27.
For a discussion of the various state constitutions which guaranteed that the accused
was to be "allowed" counsel, see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. at 829 n.38.
11. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
12. Id. at 71. Note that the holding is specifically limited to capital cases.
13. Id. at 70.
14. See id. at 71.
15. Id. at 72.
16. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
17. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. at 70-71. See supra text accompanying notes 13-15.
18. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 463 (footnote omitted).
19. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
20. See id. at 471-72 (the effect of the absence of counsel must be judged in the
totality of circumstances; facts in one setting which constitute a denial of due process
may fall short of such a denial in light of other circumstances).
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not get federal habeas corpus relief unless he made a reasonable
showing that in fact he suffered from the absence of legal
assistance."1
The Supreme Court abolished this distinction between state
and federal courts in 1963. A unanimous Court extended the
right to counsel to state criminal proceedings in Gideon v.
Wainwright.2 The Court held that "in our adversary system of
criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to
hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is pro-
vided for him. '2 3
The Court in Gideon did not discuss, however, whether the
right to assistance of counsel applied to indigent defendants
charged with misdemeanors as well as to those charged with
felonies.2 4 Nevertheless, nine years after Gideon, the Supreme
Court made it clear that no person may be incarcerated without
assistance of counsel, unless he validly waives his right.2 6
The focal point of the Supreme Court's decisions securing
the right to appointed counsel at trial has been that criminal law
and criminal procedure cannot be easily understood by the un-
trained layman. 6 Indeed, in Gideon, Justice Black summarized
21. See id. at 462-63. During the Betts hiatus, the Supreme Court made it clear that
denying a defendant the assistance of his own lawyer in any case at any stage was a per
se violation of fundamental fairness. See Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 9-10 (1954)
(Supreme Court calls the right of petitioner to be heard through his own counsel "un-
qualified"). See also Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 596 (1961) (right to have one's
own counsel guide direct examination in order to guide the testimony).
22. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
23. Id. at 344.
24. Clarence Earl Gideon was charged with having broken and entered a poolroom
with intent to commit a misdemeanor. Under the applicable state law, this offense was a
felony. Id. at 336-37.
25. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) ("We hold . . . that absent a
knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether
classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his
trial."). See also Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981) ("The
pre-eminent generalization that emerges from this Court's precedents on an indigent's
right to appointed counsel is that such a right has been recognized to exist only where
the litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation.").
The right to assistance of counsel also applies to juvenile proceedings. See In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 34-42 (1967). Moreover, the sixth amendment guarantees a defendant
the right to conduct his own defense, provided he knowingly and intelligently waives his
right after being informed of the consequences of doing so. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806 (1975).
26. This reality was recognized as early as 1938. In Johnson v. Zerbst, Justice Suth-
5
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the rationale of the Court's decisions when he wrote:
Governments, both state and federal, quite properly spend vast
sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants accused
of crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed essential
to protect the public's interest in an orderly society. Similarly,
there are few defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who fail
to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare and represent
their defenses. That government hires lawyers to prosecute and
defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the
strongest indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in
criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. The right of one
.charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental
and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours.
From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and
laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safe-
guards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in
which every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble
ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has
to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.
7
The logic of this rationale has not been limited to trial proceed-
ings. The Supreme Court has also held that counsel must be
provided for appeal.2"
erland observed that the sixth amendment
embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant
does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a
tribunal with power to take his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is
presented by experienced and learned counsel. That which is simple, orderly and
necessary to the lawyer, to the untrained layman may appear intricate, complex
and mysterious.
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 462-63.
27. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. at 344.
28. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966) ("[Ilt is now fundamental that, once
established . .. avenues [of appellate review] must be kept free of unreasoned distinc-
tions that can only impede open and equal access to the courts."); Draper v. Washington,
372 U.S. 487, 496 (1963) ("In all cases the duty of the State is to provide the indigent as
adequate and effective an appellate review as that given an appellant with funds."). See
also Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748, 751 (1967) ("As we have held again and again, an
indigent defendant is entitled to the appointment of counsel to assist him on his first
appeal."); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 713-14 (1961) (indigents must be granted
equal access to the appellate review of post-conviction proceedings).
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2. On appeal
On appeal, as at trial, the basic thesis underlying the Su-
preme Court's decisions has been that the guidance of a lawyer
is necessary to assure a fair hearing.2 9 In particular, the Court
has tried to prevent invidious discrimination on the basis of
wealth.30 Thus, a state may not grant appellate review of crimi-
nal convictions in a way which discriminates against defendants
because of their poverty."
In Griffin v. Illinois,2 for example, the Supreme Court
struck down a state rule that provided for appellate review of
criminal convictions, but denied a trial transcript to those who
could not afford to pay for the transcript. The Court asserted
that if the state provides appellate review as of right, it must
also provide an indigent with the tools to make appellate review
meaningful. 3 Justice Black stated the rationale: "There can be
no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on
the amount of money he has. Destitute defendants must be af-
forded as adequate appellate review as defendants who have
money enough to buy transcripts."
29. See, e.g., Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 742 (1967). See also supra text
accompanying note 27.
The Casenote does not address the rare circumstance when an indigent is the appel-
lee, rather than the appellant. As a general rule, the double jeopardy clause, U.S. CONsT.
amend. V, prevents government appeals of acquittals. Nevertheless, appeals of pretrial
rulings favorable to the defendant are generally permitted because jeopardy has not yet
attached. See C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 500 (1983). For instance, in the
Criminal Appeals Act of 1971, 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1982), Congress authorized the federal
government to appeal any dismissal of an indictment not barred by the double jeopardy
clause.
30. E.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
31. See, e.g., id. at 358 (only when the indigent receives the assistance of counsel
does he gain the constitutionally required equality with the "rich man, who appeals as of
right [and] enjoys the benefit of counsel's examination into the record, research of the
law and marshalling of arguments on his behalf'). See also Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,
18 (1956) ("There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which effectively denies the
poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all who have money enough to pay the
costs.").
32. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
33. Id. at 20. See also Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 483-85 (1963); Burns v. Ohio,
360 U.S. 252, 257 (1959); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles,
357 U.S. 214, 215-16 (1957) (per curiam).
34. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. at 19. See also Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. at 257
("[O]nce the State chooses to establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not
7
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On the same day that Gideon was decided, the Supreme
Court used the Griffin rationale to require California to appoint
counsel to indigent defendants on their first appeal following a
felony conviction. 5 In Douglas v. California,s" Justice Douglas
noted that state appellate review is not constitutionally required
in criminal cases, but he found "an unconstitutional line ha[d]
been drawn between rich and poor . . . where the rich man can
require the court to listen to argument of [appellate] counsel
before deciding the merits, but a poor man cannot. 's7
Douglas assures that the Gideon rationale s inures to indi-
gents who appeal. On the first appeal,39 as at trial, a court can
find no rational justification for denying an indigent appellant
the benefit of counsel's professional examination of the record,
his research of the law, and a thorough presentation of argu-
foreclose indigents from access to any phase of that procedure because of their
poverty.").
35. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. at 355-57. The Supreme Court has not indicated
whether the same right to appointed counsel on a first appeal applies to indigents
charged with a misdemeanor, but presumably it does. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367
(1979) (no indigent criminal defendant can be incarcerated unless the State has afforded
him the right to appointed counsel in his defense); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37
(1972) (Court rejected suggestion that the constitutional right to counsel applied only to
nonpetty offenses).
36. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
37. Id. at 357. See also Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. at 714 ("[T]he fourteenth
amendment weighs the interests of rich and poor criminals in equal scale, and its hands
extend as far to each.").
In his dissent, Justice Harlan strenuously objected to the ramifications apparent in
the Griffin and Douglas decisions. When the Court applied the equal protection clause to
invalidate the discriminatory impact on indigent defendants, Justice Harlan said the
equal protection clause
does not impose on the States "an affirmative duty to lift the handicaps flowing
from differences in economic circumstances." To so construe it would be to read
into the Constitution a philosophy of leveling that would be foreign to many of
our basic concepts of the proper relations between government and society. The
State may have a moral obligation to eliminate the evils of poverty, but it is not
required by the Equal Protection Clause to give to some what others can afford.
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. at 362 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. at 34).
38. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). See supra text accompanying
note 27.
39. In Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), a majority of the Supreme Court refused
to extend the Douglas rationale to appeals beyond the first appeal as of right: "The
Fourteenth Amendment 'does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advan-
tages'...." Id. at 612 (quoting San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S.
1, 24 (1973)).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol4/iss2/6
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ments on his behalf. 40
B. An Indigent's Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel
Inherent in the "noble ideal" '41 of guaranteeing the advan-
tage of counsel to the poor is the expectation that the represen-
tation will be effective. 42 Indeed, recognizing that ineffective rep-
resentation is really the equivalent of no representation at all,
some commentators argue that the courts need to develop a
clearer standard of the adequacy of representation by counsel."'
The Supreme Court took a step in that direction in 1967
when it articulated criteria to assure full and fair appellate re-
view for all indigent appellants.4 4 In Anders v. California,45 peti-
tioner's court-appointed counsel reviewed the record and sub-
mitted a conclusory letter stating that there was no merit in
petitioner's appeal. The Court found that the appellate court,
not appellate counsel, must decide whether there is a basis for
appeal.' 6 It admonished counsel to provide more assistance to
the petitioner and to the court. Relying on Griffin and on Doug-
las, the Court explained that
[t]he constitutional requirement of substantial equality and fair
process can only be attained where counsel acts in the role of an
active advocate in behalf of his client, as opposed to that of ami-
40. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. at 357-58; but cf. Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. at
614-18 (on a discretionary appeal, there is no constitutional mandate to provide counsel
where the indigent has enjoyed the benefit of counsel on his initial appeal as of right).
41. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. at 344. See supra text accompanying note 27.
42. Effective representation is crucial because "[oJf all the rights an accused person
has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his
ability to assert any other rights he may have." Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal
Procedure, 70 HAnv. L. Rav. 1, 8 (1956). See also supra notes 1-7 and accompanying
text.
43. See, e.g., Bazelon, supra note 2 (proposing that a radical reexamination of the
role of counsel is required); Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CORNELL L. REV.
1077 (1973) (examining the law on ineffective assistance and urging the courts to take a
more active role to assure effective assistance); Comment, supra note 2, at 4 (clear and
articulate rules regarding the right to effective representation is essential for just disposi-
tion of the claims).
44. The Court required counsel to advise the appellate court if he conscientiously
decides that the appeal is wholly frivolous. Counsel must support his decision by furnish-
ing to the court and the indigent a brief of anything that arguably supports the appeal.
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
45. 386 U.S. 738, 739 (1967).
46. Id. at 744.
1984]
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cus curie.. . . His role as advocate requires that he support his
client's appeal to the best of his ability.
47
This requirement affords an indigent appellant advocacy which
a nonindigent can obtain.
In Anders, the constitutionally adequate standard of assis-
tance of counsel was measured by the fourteenth amendment's
standard of fundamental fairness. 8 The Anders rule protects an
indigent appellant against the possibility that he will be totally
deprived of counsel upon appellate review of his conviction. For
example, when counsel believes there are no colorable issues to
appeal, Anders nevertheless requires counsel to present all pos-
sible claims of error for judicial scrutiny.4 In this way, Anders
reflects the fourteenth amendment's focus on fairness in the
criminal process as a whole; the indigent may not be totally de-
prived of access to the appellate court.
After Anders some commentators suggested that the ade-
quacy of representation should be measured by the sixth amend-
ment, rather than the fourteenth amendment.50 Grounding the
right to the adequate assistance of counsel on the sixth amend-
ment suggests a focus on the quality of the representation pro-
vided the individual indigent, while the fourteenth amendment
concerns itself only with fairness in the criminal process as a
whole. 1 A sixth amendment standard, it is argued, would em-
body something more than notions of fundamental fairness.52 It
47. Id. In dictum, the Supreme Court declared that an appellate court may permit
appointed counsel to withdraw, thereby depriving the indigent of the benefit of counsel,
if there are no colorable issues to raise on appeal.
48. The Anders rule is premised on notions of "substantial equality and fair pro-
cess," id.; as such the decision has roots in both the equal protection clause and due
process clauses.
49. Id. See supra note 44.
50. See Bazelon, supra note 2, at 29-30; Craig, supra note 2, at 263-64; Comment,
supra note 2, at 7.
51. Comment, supra note 2, at 7.
52. One commentator observed:
Even though the historical development of the right to effective representation
cannot be clearly linked to the recognition of the sixth amendment's right to
counsel, as a practical matter this is the most appropriate way to read the Consti-
tution. Conceptually, the right to effective representation is closely tied to the
right to counsel. The guarantee of the presence of an attorney is nugatory unless
there is also some assurance that the attorney will genuinely assist the accused.
The sixth amendment is also a more appropriate source for the right to effec-
[Vol. 4:407
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would entail review of counsel's effectiveness in the particular
case at hand.' s While the Supreme Court has never formulated a
sixth amendment standard of effectiveness, 4 several recent
cases have suggested such a constitutional standard.
In McMann v. Richardson," for instance, the Supreme
Court suggested, in dictum, that "defendants facing felony
charges are entitled to the effective assistance of competent
counsel." ' The defendant in McMann pleaded guilty on the ad-
vice of counsel.' 7 The defendant's attorney thought the admissi-
bility of defendant's confession was sufficiently probable to war-
rant a plea of guilty.5' Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that
counsel's advice on whether to plead guilty was "within the
range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases."'59
It refused to set aside the conviction.' 0 On the issue of effective
representation, the Court simply acknowledged that "defendants
cannot be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel."' 1 The
Court did not announce a standard giving content to the right of
effective assistance of counsel.'2 Rather, the Court posited that
tive representation where ineffectiveness claims are involved. The language of the
fourteenth amendment inclines courts to consider the overall fairness of the trial
without analyzing the particular acts or omissions of which the defendant com-
plains. Deciding an appeal becomes a matter of adding up the errors in the case,
deciding how much each side was harmed, and figuring whether the end result was
fair in light of what ought to have happened. Reliance on the sixth amendment,
on the other hand, promotes a salutary thoroughness in the review of ineffective-
ness claims in that it requires a reviewing court to look directly at the challenged
conduct to determine whether it was "effective."
Comment, supra note 2, at 7 (footnotes omitted).
53. Id.
54. See Maryland v. Marzullo, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978) (White, J., with Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
55. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
56. Id. at 771 (dictum).
57. Id. at 761-62. In McMann, the Supreme Court reviewed three separate habeas
corpus petitions wherein each defendant sought reversal of his respective conviction.
Each petition alleged that the defendant's representation was incompetent. References
in the text refer only to defendant Dash.
58. See id. at 762, 770.
59. Id. at 771.
60. The Supreme Court said it would not set aside a conviction unless the defendant
can "demonstrate gross error on the part of counsel," id. at 772, and can "prove serious
derelictions on the part of counsel sufficient to show that his plea [is] not, after all, a
knowing and intelligent act." Id. at 774.
61. Id. at 771.
62. Note that the case involved an examination of the assistance provided by trial
11
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"the matter, for the most part, should be left to the good sense
and discretion of the trial courts."63
A result similar to McMann was reached in Chambers v.
Maroney." Once again, the Supreme Court declined to set aside
a conviction for ineffective assistance of counsel." The Court re-
jected a petition which alleged that tardy appointment of coun-
sel 66 was a denial of effective assistance of counsel. 7 Justice
White wrote:
Unquestionably, the courts should make every effort to effect
early appointments of counsel in all cases. But we are not dis-
posed to fashion a per se rule requiring reversal of every convic-
tion following tardy appointment of counsel or to hold that,
whenever a habeas corpus petition alleges a belated appointment,
an evidentiary hearing must be held to determine whether the de-
fendant has been denied his constitutional right to counsel."
Lastly, dictum in Tollett v. Henderson9 provides some in-
dication of how a defendant might obtain reversal on sixth
amendment grounds. There the Court held that a criminal de-
fendant who pleads guilty on the advice of counsel is not auto-
matically entitled to habeas corpus relief.70 Nevertheless, after
quoting the McMann requirement71 that the advice of counsel
must be outside the range of competence demanded of attorneys
in criminal cases to merit relief,72 the Court commented: "Coun-
sel's failure to evaluate properly facts giving rise to a constitu-
counsel. See id. Reviewing courts are very reluctant to scrutinize these cases closely. See
infra notes 133-52 and accompanying text.
63. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. at 771.
64. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
65. Id. at 53-54. Chambers v. Maroney focused upon the assistance provided at trial.
See id. See infra note 163 and accompanying text for the critical distinction between
judging the performance of trial counsel and that of appellate counsel.
66. Counsel was appointed only a few minutes before trial. Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. at 53.
67. Id. at 54.
68. Id.
69. 411 U.S. 258 (1973).
70. Id. at 266 (dictum). Advice on pleading guilty is advice which is provided by
trial counsel, not appellate counsel. See infra note 163 for a discussion of the role of
counsel on appeal.
71. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. at 266 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
at 771). See supra text accompanying note 59.
72. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. at 266. See also supra note 60.
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tional claim, or his failure properly to inform himself of facts
that would have shown the existence of a constitutional claim,
might in particular fact situations 7 3 rise to the level of ineffec-
tive assistance.
While the preceding cases seem to suggest that a sixth
amendment analysis would be proper in evaluating the effective-
ness of counsel, there has been no definitive ruling to that ef-
fect.7 4 The Supreme Court was provided another opportunity to
enunciate a standard for effectiveness of appellate counsel in
Jones v. Barnes.'
III. Factual Background
A. The Trial
In Jones v. Barnes," defendant David Barnes and three ac-
complices robbed Richard Butts on March 15, 1976. 7 Barnes
was arrested and charged with robbery, assault and grand lar-
ceny. On October 26, 1976, a jury convicted Barnes of robbery
and assault.7' Barnes was sentenced, on January 17, 1977, to a
term of imprisonment of seven and one-half to fifteen years. 79
73. Toilet v. Henderson, 411 U.S. at 266-67.
74. Perhaps this is because all of these cases have necessitated evaluation of trial
counsel's effectiveness.
75. 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983).
76. 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983).
77. The accomplices were never apprehended. Brief for Petitioner at 2 n.1, Jones v.
Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983), in Record of Jones v. Barnes, No. 81-1794, presented to
the United States Supreme Court. Butts lost his watch, id., and the amount of money
taken was $60. Joint Appendix at 12 n., Jones v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983), in
Record of Jones v. Barnes, No. 81-1794, presented to the United States Supreme Court.
The state's case was based primarily on Butts' testimony. At trial, Butts claimed
that Barnes was one of his four assailants. Barnes v. Jones, 665 F.2d 427, 429 (2d Cir.
1981). The prosecution's case was buttressed by Butts' previous identification of Barnes
which occurred while Butts was in the hospital. Id.
Barnes testified in his own behalf. He presented the alibi that he was at home at the
time of the robbery. Id. at 430. Trial counsel did not call any witnesses to corroborate
this alibi; nor did counsel allude to the testimony in summation. Id.
78. Joint Appendix, supra note 77, at 4.
79. Joint Appendix, supra note 77, at 32. This term was imposed for conviction of
robbery in the first and second degree. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 160.15, 160.10 (McKin-
ney 1975). Barnes was sentenced as a second felony offender and thus is serving a con-
current term of three and one-half to seven years on the assault conviction. See N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 120.05 (McKinney 1975).
1984]
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B. The Direct Appeal
Following Barnes' conviction, the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court of New York, Second Department, granted
Barnes permission to proceed in forma pauperis.80 The court as-
signed Michael Melinger, Esquire, to prosecute the appeal. 1
In a letter to his assigned counsel, Barnes suggested several
possible claims of error for appeal.2 Melinger responded to the
letter in writing, commenting that some of Barnes' suggestions
did not provide a sufficient basis for appeal.83 Melinger listed
seven potential claims of error which he was thinking of includ-
ing in his brief.8 He asked for Barnes' reflections and sugges-
tions on these issues.85 Later, when Melinger submitted his brief
to the appellate division, he raised only three claims of error."
The record reveals that Melinger argued only the points he
80. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 77, at 4. See also N.Y. CouNr LAW § 722 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1982) (procedure for appointing counsel to indigents).
81. Joint Appendix, supra note 77, at 24-25.
82. Barnes' letter is not found in the record. Some of the claims, however, are found
in a letter from Melinger to Barnes. All of these claims refer to new facts or factual
arguments that did not form the basis of appeal. See Letter from Michael Melinger to
David Barnes (Nov. 9, 1977), in Joint Appendix, supra note 77, at 27 [hereinafter cited
as Letter]. By contrast, the arguments Melinger suggested for the appellate brief he was
preparing on behalf of Barnes, see infra note 84, and the actual claims he raised and
argued, see infra note 86 and text accompanying note 87, were legal arguments which
did form the basis of appeal.
83. Letter, supra note 82, at 27.
84. Id. at 28. The seven suggested claims were: (i) the facts do not support the
judge's determination at the conclusion of the Wade hearing that the complaining wit-
ness had independent knowledge of Barnes; (ii) the denial by the trial court of Butts'
prior medical or psychiatric testimony (as a means to impeach his identification) was
improper; (iii) the court improperly took over cross-examination of Barnes at trial; (iv)
the court allowed the identification in contradiction to N.Y. CrIM. Pnoc. LAW § 60.30
(McKinney 1981) (rule of evidence governing identification by means of previous recog-
nition); (v) the trial court improperly expressed its opinion during the course of the pro-
ceedings; (vi) the prosecutor's summation exceeded permissible grounds; (vii) the court
improperly denied the defense's request to charge on accessorial liability. Letter, supra
note 82, at 28.
85. Id. at 26. The record at the Supreme Court gives no indication whether or not
Barnes presented his thoughts on the seven potential claims to Melinger.
86. The three claims were: (i) the exclusion of evidence relating to the psychiatric
history of Butts was improper; (ii) the trial court's finding that the identification of
Barnes was based on an independent source was an error; (iii) the trial judge improperly
cross-examined Barnes. See Joint Appendix, supra note 77, at 32-33 (reprint of Brief for
Defendant-Appellant, People v. Barnes, 63 A.D.2d 865, 405 N.Y.S.2d 621 (2d Dep't 1978)
(submitted by Michael Melinger)).
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raised in this brief during oral argument at the appellate divi-
sion. 87 In addition to Melinger's brief, Barnes filed several pro se
briefs in which he raised numerous points other than those Mel-
inger argued.8 8 Barnes later claimed that Melinger should have
raised these points.8 The appellate division, however, affirmed
the conviction without opinion, 0 and the New York Court of
Appeals denied leave to appeal."
C. Further State and Federal Court Proceedings
After an unsuccessful habeas corpus petition to the federal
district court,92 and an unsuccessful appeal to the circuit court,93
Barnes petitioned the New York Court of Appeals to reconsider
its denial of leave to appeal.'4 In this petition, he contended for
the first time that he had received ineffective assistance of ap-
pellate counsel.' 5 The application was denied.'8
87. Letter from Michael Melinger to David Barnes (May 4, 1978), in Joint Appen-
dix, supra note 77, at 70.
88. Among the numerous other points raised was the claim that Barnes' trial coun-
sel was ineffective because he failed to investigate an alibi defense and because he did
not discover inaccuracies in Butts' testimony. See Joint Appendix, supra note 77, at 16-
17, 19-20 (reprint of Defendant's First Pro Se Brief, People v. Barnes, 63 A.D.2d 865, 405
N.Y.S.2d 621 (2d Dep't 1978) (notarized Sept. 6, 1977; filed Feb. 23, 1978).
89. For example, Barnes argued that Melinger should have raised the issue of trial
counsel's ineffectiveness. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 77, at app. I, 5a-6a.
90. People v. Barnes, 63 A.D.2d 865, 405 N.Y.S.2d 621 (2d Dep't 1978).
91. People v. Barnes, 45 N.Y.2d 786, 381 N.E.2d 179, 409 N.Y.S.2d 1044 (1978).
92. In 1978, Barnes petitioned, pro se, for a writ of habeas corpus in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. He raised five issues he had
raised in his pro se briefs to the appellate division, including the claim that he was de-
nied effective assistance of counsel at trial. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 77, at app. I,
5a. The district court denied the application. Id. at app. I, 7a-15a (reprint of Barnes v.
Jones, No. 78-C-1717 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 1978), affd, 607 F.2d 994 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 853 (1979)).
93. On May 10, 1979, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed this decision without opinion. Barnes v. Jones, 607 F.2d 994 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 853 (1979).
94. People v. Barnes, 49 N.Y.2d 1001, 406 N.E.2d 1083, 429 N.Y.S.2d 1029 (1980).
95. Specifically, Barnes argued that he was denied effective assistance of appellate
counsel on direct appeal because Melinger did not raise the following claims Barnes re-
quested: (i) trial counsel failed to investigate and prepare the defense; (ii) trial counsel
failed to make an offer of proof with regard to the relevance of the psychiatric history of
Butts when the trial judge refused to admit this evidence to impeach Butts; (iii) trial
counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's summation. See Brief for the Petitioner,
supra note 77, at app. I, 6a.
The last two claims were also raised by Barnes as evidence that he was denied effec-
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Subsequently, Barnes petitioned the United States district
court. He contended a writ of habeas corpus should issue, be-
cause he was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel.
91
Once again the district court denied Barnes' application." The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, however, reversed the district
court's order and remanded with instructions to grant the writ
of habeas corpus unless the state assigned new counsel and
granted Barnes leave to appeal from his 1978 conviction."
The Second Circuit ruled that assigned counsel's willful re-
fusal to raise colorable issues, despite his indigent client's insis-
tence to do so, was a deprivation of the right to the assistance of
counsel on appeal.100 The Second Circuit based its ruling upon
Anders v. California.0'
While the Second Circuit recognized that appellate counsel
has substantial discretion to make decisions regarding the tac-
tics and strategy of appeal, 02 it emphasized that a decision to
forego "potentially meritorious issues on appeal requires as
much input from client as does the decision whether to appeal in
the first instance."' 03 Thus, the Second Circuit announced a per
tive assistance of counsel at trial. Id. Barnes also challenged his conviction under New
York's coram nobis procedure. Respondent's Brief in Opposition to the Petition for a
Writ of Cert. at 6, Jones v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983), in Record of Jones v. Barnes,
No. 81-1794, presented to the United States Supreme Court.
96. People v. Barnes, 49 N.Y.2d at 1001, 406 N.E.2d at 1083, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 1029.
97. Barnes raised the same claims he raised when he petitioned the N.Y. Court of
Appeals for reconsideration. See supra note 95.
98. Barnes v. Jones, No. 80-C-2447 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 1981), reprinted in Petition
for Writ of Cert., supra note 95, at app. 25a.
99. Barnes v. Jones, 665 F.2d 427, 436 (2d Cir. 1981). As Chief Justice Burger noted
in Jones v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3311 n.3 (1983), at least 26 state and federal judges
had considered Barnes' claims before anyone found merit in them.
100. Barnes v. Jones, 665 F.2d at 433.
101. 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Anders held that appointed counsel must represent his
client vigorously and cannot simply abandon an appeal he considers frivolous. See id. at
742-44. "The constitutional requirement of substantial equality and fair process can only
be attained where counsel acts in the role of an active advocate in behalf of his client, as
opposed to that of amicus curiae." Id. at 744.
102. Barnes v. Jones, 665 F.2d at 435.
103. Id. The Second Circuit's reasoning was made emphatically clear when the court
declared:
Appointed counsel's judgment that appellant is unlikely to prevail on the merits
of his nonfrivolous arguments is no substitute for an active advocate's presenta-
tion of those arguments to the appellate court, which is the appropriate forum for
making a decision on the merits. The past half century of Supreme Court deci-
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se rule: court-appointed appellate counsel must prosecute every
nonfrivolous issue the defendant specifically asks counsel to
raise on appeal. 04
IV. The Supreme Court Opinions
A. The Majority
The majority, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice Bur-
ger, reversed the Second Circuit. It held that assigned appellate
counsel has no constitutional obligation to raise every nonfrivo-
lous issue the defendant requests the attorney to present on
appeal.10 5
As a preliminary matter, the Chief Justice noted that there
is no constitutional right to appeal.10 6 He commented, however,
sions confirms that the right to counsel is perhaps the most crucial right afforded
criminal defendants. . .. [AIppointed counsel's unwillingness to present particu-
lar arguments at appellant's request functions not only to abridge defendant's
right to counsel on appeal, but also to limit the defendant's constitutional right of
equal access to the appellate process in order to redress asserted errors at
trial-the very right that an appointment of appellate counsel was designed to
preserve.
Id. at 433-34.
104. Judge Meskill filed a vigorous dissent in which he argued that the Second Cir-
cuit's per se rule was unjustified. Id. at 437 (Meskill, J., dissenting). Judge Meskill
thought the Second Circuit incorrectly extended the rationale of Anders v. California.
He wrote:
The instant case is unlike Anders, where appellate counsel's complete refusal to
brief and argue claims left the defendant totally without the aid of counsel in
pressing his appeal. Here petitioner Barnes complains that his lawyer argued some
issues before the appellate court, but declined to argue every nonfrivolous claim
that Barnes had requested him to present.... [Iun exercising the professional skill
and judgment for which he is retained, an appellate lawyer might well decide to
forgo presentation of some issues urged by his client precisely to "support his cli-
ent's appeal to the best of his ability."
Id. (Meskill, J., dissenting) (quoting Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967)).
105. Jones v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3312 (1983).
106. Id. at 3312. Justice Brennan claimed, in his dissent, that the Court's statement
about the constitutional right to appeal was unnecessary to its decision. Id. at 3315 n.1
(Brennan, J., dissenting). This is not necessarily so. If there is no constitutional right to
appeal, it follows that an indigent appellant may have no constitutional right to compel
his appointed attorney to raise all nonfrivolous points he requested. As a practical mat-
ter, such an argument is inapposite. The question is unlikely to arise because the right of
appeal is universally provided for all significant criminal convictions. Id. (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
The Supreme Court has never held that there is a constitutional right to appellate
review of criminal convictions. Spradling v. Texas, 455 U.S. 971, 973 (1982) (Brennan, J.,
19841
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that when a state provides for appeals, it cannot foreclose an
indigent from the process. 107 Moreover, he agreed with the Sec-
ond Circuit that a defendant has the "ultimate authority" to
make certain fundamental decisions regarding his case.10 8 Never-
theless, the Chief Justice stated that Anders v. California"
does not require that a defendant have the right to compel his
attorney to argue all colorable issues on appeal."10 The decision
regarding what particular issues to present on appeal is left to
the professional judgment of the appellate attorney."'
The Chief Justice also charged that the Second Circuit's per
se rule seriously undermines counsel's ability to exercise his pro-
dissenting from denial of certiorari); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977);
Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 24 n.11 (1973). In fact, for the first 100 years of the
republic, no appeals from convictions were permitted in federal courts. Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12, 21 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). In 1894, the Supreme Court held
that there was no constitutional right to appeal. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687
(1894). The right to appeal as it exists today is based upon statutory law. See, e.g., Ab-
ney v. United States, 431 U.S. at 656.
In federal courts, appeals as of right in criminal cases were first permitted in 1889.
The Act of Feb. 6, 1889, ch. 113, § 6, 25 Stat. 655, 656, allowed these appeals "in all cases
of conviction of crime the punishment of which provided by law is death." The general
right to appeal criminal convictions in federal court was created in 1911. See Act of Mar.
3, 1911, ch. 6, § 128, 36 Stat. 1131, 1133; see also Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. at 656
n.3.
A more comprehensive review of the constitutional right to appeal is beyond the
scope of the Casenote. It is enough to note that the dissent in Barnes takes issue with
the majority's point of view. See Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3315 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
In regard to the validity of McKane v. Durston as precedent, Justice Brennan wrote:
I also have little doubt that we would decide that a State must afford at least
some opportunity for review of convictions, whether through the familiar mechan-
ism of appeal or through some form of collateral proceeding. There are few, if any,
situations in our system of justice in which a single judge is given unreviewable
discretion over matters concerning a person's liberty or property, and the reversal
rate of criminal convictions on mandatory appeals in the state courts, while not
overwhelming, is certainly high enough to suggest that depriving defendants of
their right to appeal would expose them to an unacceptable risk of erroneous
conviction.
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
107. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3312.
108. Id.
109. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
110. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3312.
111. See id. More particularly, the Chief Justice noted that "neither Anders nor any
other decision of this Court suggests . . . that the indigent defendant has a constitu-
tional right to compel appointed counsel to press nonfrivolous points requested by the
client, if counsel, as a matter of professional judgment, decides not to present these
points." Id. (emphasis added).
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fessional judgment. 12 He explained that advocates must winnow
out the weaker arguments on appeal and focus on the central
question of the appeal.113 Yet, he observed, the Second Circuit's
rule requires an advocate to add all colorable arguments, irre-
spective of their strength, and thereby cloud the key issues. 1 4
Such a rule, he wrote, would "disserve the very goal of vigorous
and effective advocacy that underlies Anders."" 5
B. Justice Blackmun, Concurring in Judgment
Justice Blackmun did not join the majority opinion." 6 He
thought it was improper for the Court to opine whether there is
a constitutional right to the first appeal from a criminal convic-
tion.117 Justice Blackmun also sympathized with the dissent: as
an ethical matter,"18 he exhorted, an attorney should argue all
colorable claims urged by his indigent client.119
C. The Dissent
Justice Brennan wrote the dissent in which Justice Marshall
joined. Justice Brennan argued that the case should be re-
manded for a determination of whether Barnes did in fact insist
that his lawyer brief the nonfrivolous issues which were not ar-
gued on appeal."10
Unlike the majority, Justice Brennan argued that the right
to counsel is more than the right to have one's case presented
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 3313.
115. Id. at 3314.
116. Although Justice Blackmun did not join the majority opinion, he concurred in
the judgment because he thought counsel's performance was "'within the range of com-
petence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.'" Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quot-
ing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). In addition, Justice Blackmun
thought that the indigent had adequate opportunity to present his claims in the state's
appellate process. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3314 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
117. Id. at 3314 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
118. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). The dissent considers the matter to be a consti-
tutional requirement, rather than merely an ethical obligation. See id. at 3316-18 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 3314 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
120. Id. at 3315 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For issues which were not raised, see
supra note 95.
1984]
19
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:407
competently and effectively.'21 He contended that the function
of counsel is to protect the dignity and autonomy of the person
on trial by assisting the person to make choices which are his to
make.12  Justice Brennan viewed the right to assistance of coun-
sel as a personal right. The sixth amendment, in his view, means
more than that the indigent shall have a defense.' To Justice
Brennan, the ultimate authority to decide what nonfrivolous is-
sues are presented belongs to the defendant." 4
In support of his position, Justice Brennan noted that an
appointed lawyer and his indigent client often have to get along
under imperfect conditions.'2 5 An indigent client often mistrusts
121. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3316 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
122. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
123. See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan's position is not a novel one.
His view of counsel's function had the support of six justices in Faretta v. California, 422
U.S. 806 (1975). In Faretta, the Supreme Court affirmed a defendant's constitutional
right to proceed without counsel after making a voluntary and intelligent choice to do so.
Id. at 835. Faretta is particularly pertinent here. Justice Stewart, acting on behalf of the
majority, wrote:
The right to defend is given directly to the accused; for it is he who suffers the
consequences if the defense fails.
The counsel provision supplements this design. It speaks of the "assistance"
of counsel, and an assistant, however expert, is still an assistant. The language and
spirit of the Sixth Amendment contemplate that counsel, like the other defense
tools guaranteed by the Amendment, shall be an aid to a willing defendant - not
an organ of the State interposed between an unwilling defendant and his right to
defend himself personally. To thrust counsel upon the accused, against his consid-
ered wish, thus violates the logic of the Amendment. In such a case, counsel is not
an assistant, but a master; and the right to make a defense is stripped of the
personal character upon which the Amendment insists.
Id. at 819-20 (footnotes omitted).
124. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3316 (Brennan, J., dissenting); accord Faretta v. Califor-
nia, 422 U.S. at 834 ("The right to defend is personal. The defendant, and not his lawyer
or the State, will bear the personal consequences of a conviction."). Justice Brennan
reasons that the indigent appellant can press nonfrivolous issues even against the advice
of counsel if he chooses. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3316 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan, however, does not ignore the Chief Justice's argument that the lawyer, not the
layman, is best able to prosecute an appeal. See id. at 3312. See also supra text accom-
panying notes 26-27. Instead he retorts:
It should take little or no persuasion to get a wise client to understand that, if
staying out of prison is what he values most, he should encourage his lawyer to
raise only his two or three best arguments on appeal, and he should defer to his
lawyer's advice as to which are the best arguments. The Constitution, however,
does not require clients to be wise.
Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3317-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
125. See id. at 3318 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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his attorney. 126 Moreover, if there are differences in socio-eco-
nomic class or in education, these differences may interfere with
their relationship.12 7 Therefore, Justice Brennan would not fash-
ion a rule which encourages an appointed lawyer to disregard his
client's wishes or which exacerbates the client's suspicion of his
lawyer.12 8 Such a rule, he thought, would not guarantee that an
indigent is provided effective assistance of counsel.1 29
V. Analysis
A. A Distinction Between Assistance at Trial and on Appeal
In one sense, the Supreme Court's vacillation over the con-
stitutional standards for the effective assistance of counsel is un-
derstandable.130 The claim of ineffective assistance is a popular
one. Few convicted defendants are satisfied with the results. It is
easy to blame counsel for the conviction.1 31 Furthermore, the
claim is somewhat subjective. Appellate courts are reluctant to
overturn an otherwise error free conviction merely because an
126. Id. at 3318 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Carrington, supra note 1, at
1300-03.
127. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3318 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
128. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan does not want an appointed law-
yer to become one of the "many indignities visited upon someone who has the ill fortune
to run afoul of the criminal justice system." Id. at 3319 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
129. See id. at 3318-19 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
130. The underlying problem is aptly captured in the following passage:
A retrospective examination of a lawyer's representation to determine whether it
was free from any error would exact a higher measure of competency than the
prevailing standard. Perfection is hardly attainable and is certainly not the gen-
eral rule, especially in professional work where intuitive judgments and spontane-
ous decisions are often required in varying circumstances. The artistry of the ad-
vocate is difficult to judge retrospectively because the elements influencing
judgment usually cannot be captured on the record. The kaleidoscopic range of
possibilities often seems limitless, and it is proverbial that the finest ideas emerge
on the way back from the courthouse. The [trial] advocate's work, therefore, is not
readily capable of later audit like a bookkeeper's.
Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736-37 (3d Cir. 1970) (footnote omitted). See also
infra note 144.
131. Since few convicted defendants are happy with the results, a natural reaction is
to blame the attorney that the state appointed to represent him, for being incompetent
or unprepared. It was the state which convicted him. The convicted indigent may very
well believe that the attorney and the state have contrived against him. See, e.g., Jones
v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3318 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Faretta v. California,
422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975).
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indignant indigent charges that he was given ineffective repre-
sentation. 3 2 Nonetheless, ineffective assistance of counsel is a
serious problem s which the Supreme Court has not adequately
confronted.134 For instance, Jones v. Barnes'36 considered the
assistance provided by appellate counsel, not trial counsel. The
earlier Supreme Court cases involving claims of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel focused upon the assistance provided by trial
counsel.3 6 In Barnes, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to
expound upon a standard of effective assistance and, at the same
time, limit its application to appellate counsel. The Court, how-
ever, did not adopt this approach. It declined to adopt a precise
standard of effective assistance of counsel on appeal. 3 7
In contrast to the appellate stage, there is, perhaps, good
reason to be reluctant to establish a precise standard of effective
assistance in criminal trials.3 8 The courtroom performance of an
attorney, for example, ordinarily involves many tactical and
strategic judgments that are not subject to categorical prescrip-
132. See, e.g., Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1973); Chambers v. Ma-
roney, 399 U.S. 42, 54 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
133. See Bazelon, supra note 2, at 2:
The adversary system assumes that each side has adequate counsel. This assump-
tion probably holds true for giant corporations or well-to-do individuals, but what
I have seen in 23 years on the bench leads me to believe a great many - if not
most - indigent defendants do not receive the effective assistance of counsel
guaranteed them by the 6th Amendment.
134. Id. One commentator advanced several policy reasons to justify the Supreme
Court's posture. Among these policies (or fears) underlying the reluctance to find that
counsel was ineffective are: 1) to honor such claims is to implicitly censure the trial
court; 2) appellate courts should not second guess defense tactics with the benefit of
hindsight; 3) there would be a flood of ineffectiveness claims; and 4) appellate courts
would have to overturn a great number of convictions if a more active approach were
adopted. See Bazelon, The Realities of Gideon and Argersinger, 33 NAT'L LEGAL AID
DEF. A. (NLADA) BRIEFCA E 57, 60 (1975); Bazelon, supra note 2, at 22-28. See gener-
ally Comment, supra note 2, at 4.
135. 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983). On certiorari to the Second Circuit, the only issue re-
viewed by the Supreme Court was the performance of appellate counsel. See supra note
89 (Barnes' argument as to why he was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel).
136. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1973); Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. 42, 53 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). See also Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 49-52 (1932). Cf. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974)
("[Tihere are significant differences between the trial and appellate stages of a criminal
proceeding.").
137. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3312.
138. See supra note 134.
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tion.'5 ' But there is no good reason to presume a precise stan-
dard of effective assistance on appeal would be detrimental in
any way. For instance, trial circumstances are unpredictable,
and counsel must be free to respond to the vagaries of the situa-
tion.140 By contrast, on appeal, counsel must operate under the
constraints of what has been established on the record.
14 1
Arguably, the appellate counsel's task is better suited for
post hoc review. On appeal, the reviewing court has the record
which provides a concrete yardstick. The reviewing court can
fairly and objectively determine whether the appellate represen-
tation violated the sixth amendment.14 1 If appellate counsel did
not properly evaluate the facts on the record which gave rise to a
substantial claim for relief, a reviewing court can discover coun-
sel's error by evaluating the argument presented by the
record. "'4
Conversely, because the trial establishes the record, a re-
viewing court examining a claim of ineffective trial counsel has
no reference point. The reviewing court's job is necessarily more
subjective and arbitrary. It cannot simply determine if a sub-
stantial claim, present on the record, was not raised on appeal.
Instead, the appellate court would have to discover what counsel
actually knew at trial; the court would have to examine the tac-
tics and strategy of trial counsel. Under these circumstances, the
indigent may, in effect, ask the reviewing court to substitute its
judgment for that of the appointed counselor. Courts are natu-
rally wary to proceed in this manner."
4
139. See supra note 130.
140. See United States v. DeCoster, 624 F.2d 196, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Leventhal,
J.) ("A defense counsel's representation of a client encompasses an almost infinite vari-
ety of situations that call for the exercise of professional judgment."). See also id. at 276
n.69 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
141. E.g., R. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 37 (1981).
142. A violation should not be determined under the fourteenth amendment. See
supra note 52.
143. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1973) (sufficiency of prepara-
tion and knowledge of relevant law is not a highly subjective determination).
144. Unless there is some extraordinary circumstance, an appellate court will not
review an action if it can do nothing but substitute its judgment. See generally NLRB v.
Universal Camera Corp., 179 F.2d 749, 752 (2d Cir.) (deference to procedure below), va-
cated, 340 U.S. 474 (1950), on remand, 190 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1951). "In appeals from the
Board we have over and over again refused to upset findings which in cold type seemed
to us extremely doubtful just because we were aware that we could not know what may
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B. Effective Assistance on Appeal and Barnes
Essentially, assistance of counsel claims fit into two catego-
ries. In the first category are cases where there is an actual de-
nial of assistance of counsel. The classic example of this type of
case is Gideon v. Wainwright.145 In the second category are cases
where the constitutional right to assistance of counsel is denied
by virtue of the ineffective representation that is rendered .'4
Cases in the second category involve, in essence, a constructive
denial of counsel. Barnes falls within this category. It does not
involve total deprivation since Barnes' counsel raised and
argured several claims.1 47
In Barnes, there is sharp disagreement over what would
constitute effective assistance of appellate counsel. 48 The disa-
greement is not about the value of the lawyer's professional
training. 4 9 Both the majority and minority agree that an indi-
gent, seeking to reverse his conviction, can benefit from a con-
cise, selective argument advanced by an able, experienced law-
yer. 50 Rather, the core of the disagreement envelops a definition
of "assistance of counsel."
have been the proper deciding factors." NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d at
431.
For a further illustration of the need to avoid substituting judgment, compare Citi-
zens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413 (1971) (where the Court found
there was law to apply, because the action complained of was not committed to agency
discretion) with Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Line, Inc., 356 U.S. 309, 318 (1958) (where
the duty to act was a matter of highly debatable inference, requiring profound exercise of
discretion) and Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297, 304-05
(1943) (peculiar nature and functions of agency determine lack of reviewability).
145. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See also Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976)
("[A]n order preventing petitioner from consulting his counsel 'about anything' during a
17-hour overnight recess between direct-and cross-examination impinged upon his right
to assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment."); Herring v. New York,
422 U.S. 853, 864-65 (1975) (trial court's refusal to permit final argument in a non-jury
case is a violation of the sixth amendment).
146. See Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940). The Court commented that
the state cannot "convert the appointment of counsel into a sham and nothing more
than a formal compliance with the Constitution's requirement that an accused be given
the assistance of counsel. The Constitution's guarantee of assistance of counsel cannot be
satisfied by mere formal appointment". Id. (footnote omitted).
147. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
148. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3313; see also id. at 3317. See supra text accompanying
notes 106-15, 120-28.
149. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3312; see also id at 3317.
150. Id. at 3317.
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To the majority, the right guaranteed by the sixth amend-
ment "reflects nothing more than the obvious fact that it is [the
indigent] who is on trial and therefore has need of a defense.M51
The majority does not interpret the sixth amendment in a way
to inhibit counsel's ability to exercise his professional judg-
ment.15 To the majority, assistance on appeal is not ineffective
because the appointed attorney avoids cluttering the appeal with
barely colorable issues.' 5 By comparison, for the dissent, be-
cause the indigent is at trial and has need of a defense, the sixth
amendment must protect his dignity and autonomy as a per-
son. 154 In the dissent's view, the sixth amendment is the indi-
gent's personal right.'" The amendment should be interpreted
to function as the instrument of the indigent's autonomy and
dignity in all phases of the criminal process. 1" These conflicting
perspectives have widely disparate consequences. The majority
places the decisions about the content of the appeal in the attor-
ney's hands, while the dissent contends these decisions are
within the defendant's province. 57
Given the facts of Barnes, its outcome is probably correct.
Although Michael Melinger specifically requested Barnes' input
when he was preparing Barnes' appeal,158 the record contains no
151. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 837 (1975) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (foot-
note omitted). Cf. supra note 139.
152. See Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3312. Note that the focus here is on counsel's role, not
the indigent's rights. Id. By contrast the dissent focuses upon the indigent's personal
rights under the sixth amendment. Id. at 3318 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See infra note
156 and accompanying text.
153. See Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3312-13. That conciseness is often the key to effective
advocacy is clear from the fact that appellate courts often impose page limits on appel-
late briefs and time limits on oral arguments. See, e.g., SUP. CT. R. 34.3 (page limits); id.
at 38.3 (time limits); N.Y. Sup. CT. R. App. Div. (2d Dep't) § 670.17(g)(2) (page limits);
id. at § 670.22 (time limits).
154. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3316 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
155. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 3318 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The image of counsel as a tool for the
indigent is imminently clear when one examines the other rights guaranteed by the sixth
amendment. A full and effective defense would hardly be possible but for the indigent's
right "to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury ... , and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
[and] to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." U.S. CONST.
amend. VI. Accord Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975).
157. See infra note 167 for the ideal allocation of authority on appeal.
158. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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evidence that Barnes ever responded to Melinger's offer.'59
Thus, as far as the facts are known, the representation was effec-
tive. The constitutional right to counsel'60 and the right to equal
access to the courts 6' should not require assigned counsel to ad-
vocate issues which are not in the best interest of the client,'62
unless the client insists that those issues be raised on appeal. 63
Barnes' right to effective assistance of appellate counsel is not
eviscerated by his decision not to participate in the appellate
process. Indeed, in such a case, the attorney must take control of
the appeal if the indigent is to get full and fair review.
Notwithstanding a just result for the parties before the
Court, the rationale employed to reach the result is troublesome.
A majority of the Supreme Court failed to give substance to the
doctrine of effective assistance of appellate counsel. Instead, it
left the responsibility of ensuring effective assistance to the indi-
vidual lawyer appointed to assist the indigent appellant."'
Moreover, the majority of the Court applied a rationale more
suited to an inquiry into effective assistance at trial than to the
kind of assistance counsel provides on appeal. 65 As the Court
correctly observed, at trial, matters of strategy and tactics prop-
erly belong in the attorney's domain. 66 It was arguably wrong,
159. See supra note 85.
160. See generally supra Part II.
161. See, e.g., Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966); Draper v. Washington,
372 U.S. 487, 496 (1963).
162. This requirement meets Chief Justice Burger's concern that a brief which
raises every nonfrivolous claim runs the risk of clouding the important issues. See
Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3313-14.
163. See, e.g., id. at 3314-15 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 3312.
165. Compare ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 1 The Defense Function,
Standard 4-5.2 (2d ed. 1980) with 4 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Criminal
Appeals, Standard 21-3.2 Comment, at 21-42 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Criminal
Appeals] (describing the different roles performed by trial counsel and appellate counsel
respectively).
166. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3313 n.6; accord Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93
(1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
Once counsel is appointed, the day-to-day conduct of the defense rests with the
attorney. He, not the client, has the immediate - and ultimate - responsibil-
tiy of deciding if and when to object, which witnesses, if any, to call, and what
defenses to develop. Not only do these decisions rest with the attorney, but such
decisions must, as a practical matter, be made without consulting the client.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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though, to assume that counsel's performance on appeal is
within the same domain.
The Supreme Court did not base its decision on the critical
distinction between counsel's role at trial and his role on ap-
peal.1 17 Strategy and tactics necessarily imply improvisation.
During the trial, a lawyer must be free to object at any point. He
must be free to make motions on his own initiative; he cannot
consult with his client before making every move. In short, the
realities of the trial environment place these responsibilities on
the attorney, not the client.
Contrarily, on appeal, the split-second decision making is
already part of the record. 1 8 Therefore, the record governs the
available strategy and tactics."' The realm of attorney discre-
tion is therefore constrained. The attorney has more time to
consult with his indigent client. The client can exercise greater
command over his representation on appeal. Hence, if the indi-
gent client wants to raise specific colorable issues, nothing in the
nature of the appellate process restrains him from doing so.
Identifying and developing appellate issues is a well-consid-
ered, thorough exercise. It would be easy for the attorney to in-
corporate his indigent client's direction. The appellate counsel
could evaluate the indigent's input in light of the record and the
applicable law. If the attorney believes including the indigent's
ideas would weaken the appeal, he can so advise his client. If the
client decides, in spite of the professional evaluation of his coun-
sel, that he wants to present a particular issue, the assigned at-
torney should assist him to do so. In this way, the attorney acts
as a true assistant for the indigent's defense. Moreover, the fiber
167. Compare supra note 166 (description of counsel's role at trial) with Criminal
Appeals, supra note 165, at Standard 21-3.2 (description of counsel's function on ap-
peal). The ABA's conception of appellate counsel's role varies greatly from counsel's job
at trial. The ABA's position on appellate counsel's role is:
[wihen, in the estimate of counsel, the decision of the client to take an appeal, or
the client's decision to press a particular contention of appeal, is incorrect[,
clounsel has the professional duty to give to the client fully and forcefully an
opinion concerning the case and its probable outcome. Counsel's role, however, is
to advise. The decision is made by the client.
Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3317 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added by Justice Bren-
nan) (quoting Criminal Appeals, supra note 165, Comment at 21-42).
168. See supra text accompanying notes 140-43.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 141-43
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of the sixth amendment assumes a meaningful form.
VI. Conclusion
Since the early 1930s, the Supreme Court has consistently
recognized the importance of providing counsel to assist an indi-
gent defendant.'70 In the 1960s, the Court assured that counsel
would be provided any time the indigent's physical liberty is
placed in jeopardy by the criminal process. 7 1 In the 1970s, the
Court suggested that the mere presence of counsel is not enough,
intimating that the indigent has a right to effective assistance of
counsel.17 2
As of 1983, the meaning of effective assistance has not been
adequately defined. In Jones v. Barnes,173 the Supreme Court
had the opportunity to clarify the concept, at least in the con-
text of an appeal. By failing to distinquish adequately between
the role of counsel at trial and on appeal, however, the Court's
decision added nothing of substance to the right to effective as-
sistance of counsel.
Richard N. Allman
170. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45 (1932). See also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
171. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. at 344-45. See also Lassiter v. De-
partment of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37
(1972).
172. E.g., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970). See supra notes 54-74 and
accompanying text.
173. 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983).
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